5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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was thought to inhere in his old garden plot and in the products growing there, or more specifically perhaps in the water flowing through the garden, for it is in the water that the dead tend to live, even though in a more general sense they are everywhere in the garden, as well as in the abode of the dead under the mountain and in other places also. The transfer of the *hamo* to the child is a drawn-out process that may last a year or so. It is done through the mediation of the stick. A mother carries this stick with her every day as she goes to the gardens and she is supposed to hang the child from the stick as she does her work. I have actually seen another mother do this for months. The child draws soul substance through the stick all the time and as the taro and other crops fill out and become vigorous, the child will do the same. It is through this absorption of *hamo* that the child can later fulfil the promise made to the dead Jarata, namely to look after the garden from which he has drawn his life-force.

The ritual formulae spoken by the parents in the garden and quoted above both clearly have the form of a bargain, by which the spirit of the deceased is asked to give *hamo* (a combination of supernatural protection and nutrient strength) to the infant in exchange for proper homage. This transaction may be expressed in the following exchange cycle.

MODEL 12



Superficially, it may appear that the exchange cycle given here offers a generalisation that goes far beyond the data I have presented. My data present a transaction between a deceased and a particular couple, with one particular child, who promise to look after the land. My model, however shows a transaction between any spirit attached to a piece of land, and any cultivator. Yet it may rightly be argued that every couple cultivates, at one time or another, a large number of plots, and that only some of these plots are linked to their cultivators through post-natal rites performed in respect of themselves or their children. This argument, however, is irrelevant. Spirits are attached to every garden plot, and there is always some person charged with the care of those spirits. The senior member of an extended family, the 'father of the ground' (*enda mama*) has the ultimate responsibility to see that the spirits are not neglected. When he gives any cultivator a usehold over a piece of land, it is understood that this cultivator takes over the care of the spirits on the land. This care includes making food offerings to the spirit on a raised platform built for that purpose. More broadly, the responsibility to the spirit also involves the proper performance of all ritual and horticultural activities prescribed as parts of the cultivation cycle.

423 425 611 from a patrilineal norm are so frequent that it is unusual for any man to hold precisely the same blocks as his father who was *enda mama* before him. Nor do clan boundaries and village boundaries remain unchanged for any length of time. In themselves, such departures from patrilineal ideology do not in the least reduce the usefulness of a descent model for the explanation of Orokaiva land tenure, providing that we can plausibly regard all departures from the patrilineal rule as random responses to the vicissitudes of life. In the past, some New Guinea ethnographers have proceeded from this assumption, whereas others (e.g. Lawrence 1967) were willing to recognise structural regularities in the transfer of land to persons other than agnates:

> The potential social relationships which can be deduced from titles to land are of great theoretical importance. They represent an interlocking system of rights and obligations which can reinforce purely biological relationships (those of kinship and descent) within the security circle. (Lawrence 1967:114)

428 423 425 The first question that needs to be resolved, in the case of the Orokaiva, is whether there is really a *rule* enjoining a man to leave his land to his sons (if he has any). I found the rule to be much more ambiguous. If a man has sons, he is expected to leave them *at least half* his land, but he is free to dispose of the other half to others – sisters, daughters, adopted children, for example. Thus a degree of freedom of disposition *is built into the Orokaiva system.* The many cases of non-patrilineal inheritance quoted by Rimoldi, and others I could add, are therefore not exceptions to a rule but the operation of a rule clearly stated by informants. In this discussion, I shall first show on a purely empirical basis that some land transfers are explained by a principle of descent and others on the principle of what Lawrence calls reinforcement of relationships within the security circle. Next, I shall investigate how far the transactional model developed above can provide a principle of higher generality which will sufficiently explain *all* land transfers, patrilineal and other. In the present section I shall concentrate on transfers within the patrilineage.

596 423 [554] [769] We have seen earlier in this discussion that the obligation to 'look after' a plot of land formally arises out of an arrangement between an individual (a newly born child) and an ancestor. In practice, however, the ultimate responsibility falls on the head of the extended family, the 'father of the ground' (*enda mama*). This *enda mama* inherits his title from his father or elder brother who died before him. If he has sisters, younger brothers, children or grandchildren, all these will regard him as *enda mama.* Thus, the death of an individual will not affect the performance of the obligation to ancestors living on the land, as the *enda mama* will either discharge these obligations himself or appoint some other occupier to carry them out.

596 [627] Politically, the *enda mama* acts as leader of his group both externally and internally. In external disputes he champions members of his group against the claims of outsiders. This role is an exceedingly important one and many examples are given where a young man who had a perfectly valid claim to land could not take possession of it because he had nobody to 'speak for him'. (His father was dead.) Internally, in conflicts between members of the extended family, the word of the *enda mama* is final. Nobody outside the family can

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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intervene, nor can juniors overrule the *enda mama*. In theory, a man who will not accept the decision of the *enda mama* has no option but to leave the village and forfeit his patrimony. 596

Economically, the *enda mama* is theoretically in full control of all products of the soil and of all resources owned by his family. He also has full control over the allocation of land to family members and others, with the proviso that his sons, if any, should get at least 'half' of the land when he dies. [423] [428]

In summary, the religious, political and economic attributes of the extended family enable us to describe it undoubtedly as a corporate group. It has to be recognised, however, that the parcels of land controlled by this corporation vary considerably from generation to generation. A corporation will shed parcels which are permanently vested in other lineages, and will obtain new parcels from uterine kin and others. Plant (n.d.), Belshaw (1951), Crocombe and Hogbin (1963) have all treated this land corporation as comprising a 'lineage', so that it may seem idiosyncratic that I am calling it an 'extended family'. My reason for changing the description is that I was unable to find any case of an extended family lacking an *enda mama*. There are, of course, lineages comprising more than one extended family, but in such cases one finds more than one *enda mama*. Crocombe and Hogbin, faced with this phenomenon, added the term 'sub-lineage' to their pyramid of segmentary patrilineal groupings, but their small sample contains no case of a 'sub-lineage' comprising more than one extended family. In these circumstances we may well delay discussion of the range of control of the *enda mama* until we examine patrilineal ideology in Chapter X. 596 613 [423] [425]

We notice, however, an apparent conflict between patrilineal ideology and practice. According to the ideology, an Orokaiva patrimony is passed on from an *enda mama* to his successor; there is no rule for splitting up the patrimony between the sons of a deceased *enda mama*. How does it come about, then, that every extended family has its own *enda mama*? The process is easy to describe. It is customary for an *enda mama* to allocate land to all married men of his extended family on a more or less permanent basis. He has the right to change these allocations when special circumstances arise but changes do not occur often. As the *enda mama* becomes older, and less able to make his own gardens, he tends to distribute more and more plots, either to his sons or to other persons of his choice. Though the patrimony remains undivided in theory, in practice it is being divided. In this subdivision, the rights of brothers are supposed to be equal regardless of seniority. 596 423 425 [428]

When the older brother dies, the position of *enda mama* passes to the younger brother. The sons of the elder brother then retain no rights of succession and will depend for their well-being on the new *enda mama*, their uncle, who often adopts them if they are young. If the younger brother dies, and there are no other brothers left, the younger brother's eldest son becomes *enda mama*. The custom in such cases seems to be that the portion of the original patrimony set aside for the elder brother should go to the sons of the elder brother; the portion set aside for the younger brother should go to the sons of the latter. Theoretically the eldest son of the younger brother would be *enda mama* over the entire original patrimony but in practice a gradual splitting up would be inevitable. Orokaiva do not easily accept the authority of their cousins or adoptive brothers. 596 428

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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In any case, there are no strong economic or political reasons to prevent the splitting of the patrimony. Nor are there religious reasons, because every married male is fully competent to carry out ritual in the garden he is cultivating. The Orokaiva do not have primogeniture in the sense intended by Raglan (1963:100); it is not in the *enda mama* that the spirits of the ancestors are reincarnated, but in all the individuals of the extended family. The *enda mama*, therefore, is not the sole channel of charisma, but rather a kind of revered manager. He usually contrives to keep the patrimony together through the respect and obedience that is due, in Orokaiva custom, to a father and elder brother. I know of several instances where this authority was challenged and found that, in practice, the sons of younger brothers were not cut out of the patrimony, but their share was cut out and the relationship was severed.

Informants were all agreed that at any time either the *enda mama* or the junior member of a land-holding corporation may opt out of the relationship: such a separation involves, first of all, the breaking down of a social relationship in which protection is exchanged for deference and obedience. Therefore such a breakdown involves a high cost for both partners. When I inquired into some breakdowns that actually happened at Sivepe, I was given two kinds of explanation: (*a*) the senior partner broke off the relationship because he was not obeyed; (*b*) the junior partner broke off the relationship because the senior 'did not look after the land properly'. The first kind of explanation suggests that the elder partner, not receiving obedience, no longer received any rewards from the relationship and therefore terminated it. The second kind of explanation is more obscure as I never could find out just *how* the seniors had failed to protect the land. I gather there had been bad harvests, that the juniors thought something was wrong with the land, or that the senior had done something to provoke sorcery which endangered all the land of his lineage. Whatever the details, the juniors felt that the cost of deference to their elder brother was no longer warranted, in view of the amount of 'protection' they received. There was no fear, in any of these cases, that such a separation would be followed by retribution, physical, magical or supernatural. As I showed in Chapter III, the Orokaiva accepts fraternal strife as a natural consequence of events in primal time.

When such separations occur within a three-generation extended family, they are regarded by the community as (minor) misfortunes. On the other hand, they are regarded as normal when they occur between first cousins in a four- or five-generation lineage. Implicit in such judgements is a notion that there is a lower and an upper limit to the useful size of corporate groups. The young man who loses land rights because he has nobody to 'speak for him', obviously needs incorporation in a group. The secure man in middle age who has his land interests cut out of the control of the *enda mama* obviously feels that the useful upper limit of the corporate group has been exceeded. We may express the transactions at the lower and upper limit of the useful size of groups in the following exchange cycles:

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MODEL 13

MODEL 14



Models 13 and 14, when considered together, represent two phases of the history of a family. In the first phase a man who has separated out, aided by his sons, establishes his own landed estate. Gradually, he adds to his estate in various ways (conquest, inheritance from maternal relatives, etc.) and he adds to the number of adherents to whom he is *enda mama*. Before two generations have elapsed, the estate thus established will probably be subdivided again. The process of incorporation and subdivision repeats itself *ad infinitum*, and may be expressed in the following cycle:

MODEL 15



5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
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613 Previous research such as that of Rimoldi (1966) has shown clearly enough that the Orokaiva patrilineage is not *in practice* an enduring corporate group. The model I am proposing here goes further: it states a rule according to which [428] patrimonies are fragmented and the fragments constituted into new units. It follows from this rule that neither lineage membership nor the principle of patrifiliation (cf. Barnes 1962, 1967) suffices to account for the inheritance of landed estates.

596 428 The basic condition for inheritance is that there should be a continuing filial or quasi-filial relation, usually based on co-residence and filial services, thus inducing the *enda mama* to make an appropriate response and continue the protection of the real or fictive junior, as symbolised by the transfer of land, often in gradual steps during the *enda mama's* lifetime.

Having shown that patrifiliation is not a sufficient condition for land inheritance, we shall proceed in the next section to show that it is also not a necessary condition. This argument will be followed by an exposition of an alternative model based on the principle of exchange.

5. *Transfers of Land outside the Corporate Group*

423 425 [428] The land transfers so far discussed were conducted between agnates and largely prescribed by rules of inheritance. We have seen that there is some freedom of disposition, as the father is not obliged to transmit more than half of his land to his sons. His freedom is even greater if he has no resident sons or brothers. Even a man with many sons and brothers, and with only limited land holdings, is not prevented from making occasional land transfers, though these are more likely to be on only a temporary basis.

423 425 613 614 The extent of known transfers outside the rules of patrilineal succession has been recorded for the villages of Sivepe and Inonda. In Sivepe more than half of 104 parcels of land belonging to the Jegase clan have been so transferred (Rimoldi 1966:59) whereas only 15 out of 34 gardens investigated were planted by primary members of the right-holding lineage (*ibid.*: 70). In Inonda, the proportion was 20 out of 55 (Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:34). Recipients were sometimes members of the same clan but of a different lineage: sometimes they were members of another clan. The whole of the land now occupied by the Andiriha clan of Inonda was donated by the Tandai'undi of Seva in 1915, when they were affines.

423 425 583 [593] [582] Most of these transfers were made to sisters and daughters of the *enda mama* and, by implication, to the men who had married these women. They were most commonly full sisters and full daughters, but there are many cases involving classificatory and adoptive relationships. The making of such gifts depends partly on inclination; a man who greatly dislikes his son-in-law will not settle land on him. If the daughter marries outside a radius of about three miles from the home village, she usually receives no land. Many women who marry in a neighbouring village receive land close to the boundary. The popular explanation of such gifts is the deep love between a man and his sister (or his daughter). There is, however, another consideration which may have encouraged these transfers: the Orokaiva practised preferential patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, so that a village which allowed a woman to cultivate land, while married in an

474 share to the owner of the land. This activity started some time after
177 1947 and ceased with the eruption of Mount Lamington. It involved
241 "everybody" at Pamba. At Inonda, both rice and peanuts were tried out. The rice was planted in one block, without subdivisions; it was hulled and sold at Higaturu government station, the money was distributed. There were two harvests between the time people started to grow rice and the time of the eruption, when rice was abandoned. Proceeds were 18 pounds and nine pounds; people's shares were two to three pounds each. The mission had nothing to do with the activity, but only the government, so I was told.

The evidence, limited as it is, leads one to wonder whether the rice produced by the cooperatives was really unsaleable, as Dakeyne suggests (1966: 61-62). On the other hand, there is no doubt that the mission lacked any marketing facilities and I would strongly agree with Dakeyne that the cooperative movement could never have succeeded except on the basis of cash sales for good prices. Sivepe, acting under mission influence, ate their own rice and did not attempt to sell it. When the people came back after the eruption, the rice was "spoiled," the deacon had been transferred to another station. In Inonda, the crop had likewise been "spoiled." Dakeyne reports that in 1951, the rice was attacked by a species of "army worm;" the District Agricultural Officer ordered all crops destroyed.

474 The pattern of production of the Sivepe rice resembles that
241 of the communal yam gardens. There also, several men may plant together in the garden of one of them; the users are then expected
[427] to make a gift of yams to the owner before taking away their own. If we put this strictly in contractual terms, a man leases land to others for one year for a fee. The lessees, together with the owner (who retains one section for himself), club together as a kind of working bee for the planting and harvesting (and perhaps some other operations). This traditional pattern was revived after the eruption in the establishment of coffee and rubber stands. Its significance, however, is somewhat changed if such common cultivations are carried on not for the sake of growing food for feasts (such as the yams), but for cash (as in the case of rubber and coffee and perhaps rice). When a common plot is established for cash crops (but not yams), the Sasembata district people call this a "company;" they speak of "company land"--the word "company" being a borrowed English word incorporated in Orokaiva vocabulary. This word has mildly millennial overtones: a "company" is the means by which the Orokaiva may acquire wealth equal to that of
[829] the Europeans. It would be unfair to say, with Kleekham, that the "company" of the Orokaiva is a mystical and magical device; it is in fact a representation of what Orokaiva believe European business to be like.

471 Today, Sivepe has three forms of economic organisation. The
[596] dominant one is that where the factors of production are entirely provided by the extended family and where the product is appropriated by the extended family also. This sytem applies to subsistence as

TABLE 15

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION; SIVEPE AND INONDA COMPARED

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Note: The term "augmented," applied to a household, denotes that the household includes adults outside the nuclear (or extended) family, but that these adults are living without a spouse.

Household Type	Inonda	Sivepe
1 Generation	1	3
Nuclear	2	12
Augmented Nuclear	-	2
Double Nuclear	2	-
Simple 3-Generation	1	4
Augmented 3-Generation	1	3
TOTAL	7	24

27: Schwimmer E-5 (1966-1970) 1979 OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23

taro ancestress is usually described as discovering the taro in a lake or other 'round water'. The demigod Totima comes closest to providing a general model of the primeval world of the swidden agriculturist and pig-raiser. Like Prometheus he is a sacrificial figure.[16]

Totoima was at the origin of the feasting institution (though there are other myths of the origin of feasting). It is here that questions of moral values mostly arise as feasting (*ergo* peace making) is the moral act *par excellence*. A direct connection is laid between the virtue of settling conflict and of feasting on the one hand and the fertility and yield of the garden on the other, as enemies are thought to ensorcell the gardens. Another important factor was the 'care' (*simbari*) (a general term covering magical as well as technical aspects) taken of the garden. The eldest male of the extended family, as father of the land, had a special duty as regards *simbari*. Garden magic was, however, made by all married males; they also made gifts to ancestors, who were thought to live in gardens and be reborn from there.

The model of the virtuous man was he who shared out his produce and made feasts (*hande embo*). Such a man would grow a surplus of food in a feasting garden. His power (*ivo*) would be manifest in the abundance of his pigs and taro. The model of the 'active man' would be the organizer of feasts in which the whole village participated (*kiti jigari embo*). Subordinate to him, but still high in reputation, would be experts at sorcery, healing, feather decoration and various forms of hunting, as well as those excelling in debate, rhetoric and diplomacy (*keari embo*).[17]

Identification occurred not only with crops, gods and ancestors, but also with trees harbouring local spirits, plant emblems harbouring lineage ancestors, animal guardians and plant doubles which were kept in the garden (usually surrounded by medicinal herbs) and contained the owner's life spirit, or perhaps name-spirit for the man bore the plant's name. A more complex aspect of identification with pigs and feast gardens is that such produce is destined to be given away, i.e. the owner expects to lose control over it; yet the donor remains identified with it and it calls for a return.[18] The same is true for the range of manufactures (clothes, pots, ornaments) that change hands at feasts.

The pattern described here is characteristic of what Sahlins (1974) called the domestic mode of production. Such a system produces, in his opinion, nothing but use values, even if they are 'exchanged' at feasts, for such 'exchange' is symbolically equivalent to a temporary extension of commensality. Slightly more complex